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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Memorandum Decision and Order of the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District affirming the judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial on July 25,
2013, finding the appellant guilt of "driving without privileges," a misdemeanor.

FACTSANDPROCEDURALIDSTORY
On February 15, 2013, at about 9:29 in the morning, Officer Brett Bateman was
patrolling Overland Road, traveling eastbound and approaching Locust Grove. Trial Transcript
("Tr.") at 4, 6. Officer Bateman noticed a gray Volkswagen Jetta in the lane to his right. Tr. at
5-6. His attention was drawn to the fact that the driver was glancing often into the rearview
mirror and had his hands in the two-and-ten positions. Id. Even though both of those habits are
characteristic of many lawful, attentive drivers, Officer Bateman's suspicion was aroused, and he
ran the Jetta's plates. Tr. at 6. The registered owner of the Jetta, Shernnor Williams, was listed
as suspended. Tr. at 7-11. Officer Bateman pulled up alongside the Jetta and was able to look at
the driver for approximately six seconds while driving and comparing to the picture on his
computer screen, and surmised that the driver was Mr. Williams. Tr. at 12. The Jetta turned
right into an apartment complex, and Officer Bateman lost touch with the driver. Tr. at 14.
Officer Bateman eventually got Mr. Williams's phone number by checking with the
landlord at Mr. Williams' s last address on record, and spoke to him on the phone, at which time
Mr. Williams said he could not remember driving that day. Tr. at 16-18. The next day, Mr.

Williams met with Officer Bateman in the parking lot; again denied driving on the day before;
stated that he was not aware of the suspension on his license, which he said he thought had been
taken care of. Tr. at 17-18. Mr. Williams was then cited for driving without privileges.
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Mr. Williams testified that he had not been living at the address on record, and first

learned of this matter when a family member texted him Officer Bateman's number. Tr. at 31.
Mr. Williams testified that he was not driving at all and has either been taking taxis or having
friends drop him off, and he ended up getting cited when he voluntarily met with Officer
Bateman in the Idaho State Police Department's parking lot. Tr. at 32-34.
The instant case was opened on February 21, 2013. The matter came on for pretrial
conference on April 17, 2013 and was set for trial on May 21, 2013. On that date, the case was
reset for pretrial conference, and another pretrial conference was held on July 1, 2013. The case
came on for trial before a jury on July 25, 2013, and the jury returned a guilty verdict the same
day. Also on the same day, Mr. Williams was sentenced to serve two days with all options; a
fine of $150.00 plus court costs; public defender reimbursement in the amount of $300.00.
Neither probation nor a driver's license suspension was imposed. A notice of appeal was filed
on August 21, 2013. Oral argument was presented on March 20, 2014, and the District Court
entered a Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the conviction on March 26, 2014.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether permitting Officer Bateman to identify Mr. Williams in court and testify to his
out-of-court identification of Mr. Williams constitutes fundamental error?
Whether the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to establish the identity of the driver
observed by Officer Bateman on February 15, 2013?
Whether the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to establish that Mr. Williams had
knowledge of his license suspension in effect on February 15, 2013?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In an appeal from a final judgment of a magistrate judge following an appeal to a district
judge sitting as an appellate court, [this Court] reviews the record of the magistrate judge
independently of the decision of the district judge." State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d
1306 (1992) citing Robinson v. Joint School Dist. No. 331 Minidoka, 105 Idaho 487, 490, 670
P.2d 894, 897 (1983).
ARGUMENT
A.

Allowing Officer Bateman to identify Mr. Williams in court and testify about his
unreliable out-of-court identification violated Mr. Williams's due process rights and
constituted fundamental error.
An error alleged for the first time on appeal may only be reviewed by an appellate court

under Idaho's fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,228,245 P.3d 961, 980
(2010).

Under this doctrine, the appellant "bears the burden of persuading the appellate court

that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3)
was not harmless." Id.
1.

The court violated Mr. Williams 's due process rights by allowing Officer Bateman to
(1) testify about his out-of-court identification of Mr. Williams as the suspect driver
and (2) identify Mr. Williams in court.

Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the
Idaho Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant due process of law. Due process protections
may be violated when a court permits an in-court identification of a defendant based on an
unreliable out-of-court identification.
(1983).
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See, State v. Hosington, 104 Idaho 153, 657 P.2d 17

To determine whether a defendant's due process rights have been violated, the Court
must determine: (1) whether the out-of-court identification was impermissibly suggestive, and
(2) whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable even though
the identification procedure was suggestive. See, State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584,301 P.3d 242
(2013).
The pre-trial identification process was overly suggestive because Officer Bateman
pulled up a photo of the registered owner of the vehicle-Mr. Williams-for the explicit purpose
of identifying the driver of the vehicle as Mr. Williams.

Tr. at 11.

By searching for a

photograph of the person he already suspected as the driver of the vehicle, Officer Bateman
created a "substantial likelihood of misidentification." Cf State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 301
P.3d 242 (2013) (police procedure held overly suggestive, in part, because officer used single
photograph of multiple people to identify defendant). This procedure of pulling up a single
picture to identify the driver as the registered owner of the vehicle-the person with the license
suspension-is less a perfunctory criminal investigation than an effort to confirm Officer
Bateman's pre-existing belief that the driver was in fact the registered owner.

This bias-

confirming procedure was essentially the kind of "single suspect show-up" that is "inherently
suspect and not generally condoned." State v. Hosington, 104 Idaho 153,162,657 P.2d 17, 26
(1983).
An examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Officer Bateman's pre-

trial identification of the driver further undercuts the reliability of his identification. The Court
employs a five-factor test for reliability: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the perpetrator, (2)
the witness's degree of attention, (3) the witness's accuracy of description, (4) the witness's level
of certainty, and (5) the time between the crime and pretrial confrontation. Almaraz, 154 Idaho
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at 595, 301 P.3d at 253. To properly analyze these factors, the Court should also consider the
following estimator variables, which have been proven to diminish the reliability of a witness's
identification:
(1) stress; (2) the use of a visible weapon during a crime; (3) the shorter the
duration of a criminal event; (4) the greater the distance and the poorer the
lighting conditions; (5) increased levels of intoxication; (6) the use of disguises
during the crime and changes in facial features between the time of initial
observation and a subsequent identification; (7) the greater the period of time
between observation and identification to law enforcement; (8) race-bias; and (9)
feedback from co-witnesses confirming the identification of a perpetrator.
Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 594,301 P.3d at 252 citing State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 27 A.3d

872, 885 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
Officer Bateman spent approximately six to seven seconds glancing sideways at the
suspect vehicle while dividing his attention between the road, traffic, his computer screen, and
the driver. Tr. at 21-22. Officer Bateman himself testified that the driver "wouldn't look over at
me," (Tr. at 11-14), which means Officer Bateman identified the driver solely by glancing at the
driver's left-side profile. Presumably, the photograph summoned to Officer Bateman's computer
screen showed Mr. Williams's face from a frontal perspective, rather than from the side.
Moreover, Officer Bateman admitted that while attempting to identify the driver, both of the
vehicles were in constant motion in a "40-rnile-an-hour speed zone." Tr. at 13, 21. These facts
alone suggest that Officer Bateman had no more than a de minimis opportunity to view the driver
and that the officer's degree of attention was also negligible.
Officer Bateman failed to provide an accurate description of the person he identified as
Mr. Williams.

He could not remember any aspects of the driver's identity that were not

themselves contained in the registration photo, such as whether the driver was wearing a hat,
scarf, sunglasses, or facial hair
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testimony regarding which was all couched in reserved terms

such as "I don't believe so"; "I couldn't see any that was visible"; "No sunglasses that I recall."
Tr. at 20-21.
The fourth factor, the witness's level of certainty weighs in favor of the appellant because
Officer Bateman's testimony-that he was "100 percent sure" that the driver was Mr.
Williams-belies the circumstances. As discussed, Officer Bateman took sideways glances at
the driver, short in duration, while maneuvering his own patrol vehicle; later on, Officer
Bateman could not even recall what color shirt the driver was wearing. Tr. at 21, 24. The
overconfidence demonstrated in Officer Bateman's testimony may well be due to the overly
suggestive, bias confirming procedure used by to identify the driver as Mr. Williams.

See

Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 595, 301 P.3d at 253 citing State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 291 P.3d 673,
689 (2012) for the proposition that "the current scientific knowledge and understanding
regarding the effects of suggestive identification procedures indicates that self-reported evidence
[a witness's level of certainty and degree of attention] can be inflated by the suggestive procedure
itself." This Court has admonished trial courts to "be cautious in the amount of weight they give
to a witness's degree of certainty in their identification when police have used overly suggestive
procedures, particularly when confirmation feedback has been given." Id. By testifying to a onehundred percent degree of certainty, Officer Bateman simply tried to buttress his biased and
conclusory identification of Mr. Williams as the driver.
The "totality of the circumstances" factors weigh even more heavily in appellant's favor
when considered in light of the estimator variables. Although Officer Bateman did not testify to
being stressed while attempting to identify the driver and operate his own vehicle in a safe,
attentive manner, he did admit to a level of "multitasking" that would generate stress in an
ordinary person. Tr. at 21-22. As previously discussed, the "criminal behavior," if there was
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any, lasted only a few seconds from the perspective of this witness. Furthermore, the pre-trial
identification was almost certainly tainted with race-bias: Mr. Williams is black and Officer
Bateman is white. See, Almaraz, 154 Idaho n.594 ("Studies have shown that a witness may have
more difficulty making an identification when the suspect is of a different race than the
witness.").
The overly suggestive use of a single photograph to identify the suspect driver together
with the short duration of the officer's observation, multiple distractions, and racial-bias make
the pre-trial identification extremely unreliable.

Allowing Officer Bateman to identify Mr.

Williams in court as the driver and testify to his pre-trial identification of Mr. Williams as the
driver violated Mr. Williams's due process rights.
2. The due process violation in this case is plain.from the record and was not harmless.
The due process violation in this case-allowing Officer Bateman to identify Mr.
Williams in court as the person he observed driving--constituted fundamental error because the
error is plain from the record and applicable legal precedent and the error was far from harmless.
This Court need not refer to extrinsic sources to identify the due process violation in this case;
and the failure to object to Officer Bateman's testimony was clearly not a tactical maneuver
meant to invite error. Furthermore, Officer Bateman's unreliable identification was the only
evidence introduced by the state to prove that Mr. William's was operating the Volkswagen Jetta
on the day in question. The admission of this testimony was plainly not harmless because the
jury would have otherwise had absolutely no evidence to find that Mr. Williams was operating a
motor vehicle while his driving privileges were suspended.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT- Page 7

B. That Mr. Williams Was the Driver Observed by Officer Bateman Was Not Supported

by Substantial Competent Evidence.
An accused's right to demand proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is of
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).

The right to

demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock constitutional principle.

See In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ("Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt
standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered."' (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968)). "Simply stated, the fact that defendant is 'probably' guilty does not equate with guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Ill. 2004).
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 944 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1997), it was stated that:
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt ... [w]e will not substitute our
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence ... [m ]oreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution.

Id at 594-595, 944 P .2d at 729-730 (citations omitted).
In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that,
"[e ]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it
in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 961.
"The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not based on a technical or subtle defect. The
defense simply says that there was not enough admissible evidence to convict the defendant."

State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877, 908 P.2d 566, 570 (Ct. App. 1995).
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The evidence relied upon at trial to support Officer Bateman's identification of Mr.
Williams was not substantial or competent. The identification of Mr. Williams as the driver was
not reliable. To determine reliability, this Court applies a two-step test, see State v. Hoisington,
104 Idaho 153 (1983).

The first step is for a defendant to establish that the identification

procedure was overly suggestive. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967); Hoisington,
104 Idaho at 162. The second step is for the court to consider whether the identification was
nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. This requires considering the
witness's opportunity to view the suspect; his degree of attention; the accuracy of his description;
his level of certainty; the time between the offense and pretrial confrontation; and then weighing
those factors against the "corrupting effect of the suggestive identification."

Manson v.

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 108 (1977); Hoisington at 162. Since the factors are weighed against

each other, the more suggestive the procedure used, the more indicia of reliability will be
required to outweigh it.
In the present case, all aspects of Officer Bateman's identification were exceedingly
suggestive. He had the registered owner's face in his police computer before he even pulled up
to view the driver. His attempts to accurately identify the driver were de minimis: six to seven
seconds of glancing sideways while dividing his attention between the road, his computer screen,
and the driver. Tr. at 21-22. Officer Bateman himself testified that the driver "wouldn't look
over at me," Tr. at 11-14. Officer Bateman testified that he was "100 percent sure" that the
driver was Mr. Williams, despite the fact that he could not recall what color shirt the driver was
wearing. Tr. at 21, 24.
It is not reasonable for a rational trier of fact to believe that someone, even an officer,
could take a distracted six-to-seven-second glance at a driver's profile and be "100 percent sure"
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that the driver matches the frontal view picture on the police computer. It becomes even more
unreasonable upon consideration of the fact that the officer could not remember any aspects of
the driver's identity that were not themselves contained in the registration photo, such as whether
the driver was wearing a hat, scarf, sunglasses, or facial hair - testimony regarding which was all
couched in reserved terms such as "I don't believe so"; "I couldn't see any that was visible"; "No
sunglasses that I recall." Tr. at 20-21. The inability to remember with certainty simple, obvious
details while testifying to "100 percent" recollection of other information casts Officer
Bateman's identification into considerable doubt.
Later, in the Idaho Police Department parking lot, Officer Bateman "verbally identified"
Mr. Williams as the suspected driver. Tr. at 17. A verbal identification was not an identification
based on observed visual similarity to the individual driving the car, but an identification based
on the name from the registration, and it in no way supports the visual identification made by
Officer Bateman the day before. A rational trier of fact would have recognized the officer's brief
identification as a convenient jump to conclusions, not as competent, substantial evidence that
leaves the driver's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.
In this case, the identification procedure is overly suggestive: viewing a photo; taking a
glance from a moving car at a driver who is believed in advance is the person on the photo.
Officer Bateman testified in conclusory terms that the driver was the person on the registration,
and expressed his certainty making that connection, but he did not provide an otherwise accurate
description of the driver, and did not even visually identify Mr. Williams as the driver the next
day in the Idaho State Police parking lot.

Because of the overly suggestive identification

procedures used and the conclusory statements made by Officer Bateman in lieu of any
independent evidence showing that the driver was Mr. Williams, Officer Bateman's eyewitness
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identification did not provide substantial, competent evidence that a rational trier of fact could
have relied upon to find that Mr. Williams was in fact driving. His conviction should therefore
be reversed.
B.

That Mr. Williams Knew on February 15, 2013 that His License Was Suspended
Was Not Supported by Substantial Competent Evidence.

In order to be guilty of driving without privileges, the accused must have knowledge that
he does not have driving privileges at the time he is driving. Section 18-8001, Idaho Code, sets
forth four ways in which the accused could be said to have knowledge that his driving privileges
have been suspended:
(2) A person has knowledge that his license, driving privileges or permit to drive
is revoked, disqualified or suspended when:
(a) He has actual knowledge of the revocation, disqualification or suspension of
his license, driving privileges or permit to drive; or
(b) He has received oral or written notice from a verified, authorized source, that
his license, driving privileges or permit to drive was revoked, disqualified or
suspended; or
(c) Notice of the suspension, disqualification or revocation of his license, driving
privileges or permit to drive was mailed by first class mail to his address pursuant
to section 49-320, Idaho Code, as shown in the transportation department records,
and he failed to receive the notice or learn of its contents as a result of his own
unreasonable, intentional or negligent conduct or his failure to keep the
transportation department apprised of his mailing address as required by
section 49-320, Idaho Code; or
(d) He has knowledge of, or a reasonable person in his situation exercising
reasonable diligence would have knowledge of, the existence of facts or
circumstances which, under Idaho law, might have caused the revocation,
disqualification or suspension of his license, driving privileges or permit to drive.
At trial, under cross-examination, Mr. Williams was asked the following question: "And
you are aware that the suspension went into effect on your license on December 14th , 2012, is
that correct?" He replied: "Yes, I do." Tr. at 34. Mr. Williams was undoubtedly aware at trial
of his suspension, because he had been cited for that charge, and attended several legal
proceedings on the subject of the charge.
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At the time of the charge, the only testimony

introduced at trial on that point was from the witness, Officer Bateman, who testified that when
he questioned Mr. Williams about the status of his license, Mr. Williams had that he was not
aware that it was still suspended, and he thought that it had been taken care of. Tr. at 18.
Officer Bateman testified that "After I [Officer Bateman] ran that check I noticed that the
registered owner was currently suspended, driving privileges were suspended."

Tr. at 11.

Another witness, Ms. O'Neil from the Department of Transportation, simply reviewed Mr.
Williams's record and stated "He was suspended at that time." Tr. at 26. This testimony, taken
cumulatively and as true, merely establishes that Mr. Williams' s driving privileges were
suspended, and that Mr. Williams knew about the suspension and its effective dates at the time of
trial.
The only testimony concerning any knowledge of revocation or notice given was Officer
Bateman's statement that Mr. Williams had claimed ignorance of the current suspension being in
effect. Mr. Williams did not admit, and the State did not attempt to prove, that Mr. Williams had
actual knowledge of any lack of privileges on February 15, 2013. No record or testimony was
shown at trial that would tend to show that Mr. Williams received a written notice, or that such
notice had been mailed first class to his address. There was no attempt by the State to show that
Mr. Williams's belief that his suspension was taken care of was an unreasonable belief, or that

any action or inaction taken by Mr. Williams in reliance on that belief was unreasonable.
The complete dearth of evidence presented on Mr. Williams's knowledge of his license
suspension would be such that a rational trier of fact would not have substantial evidence from
which to infer that the State had met its burden on proving Mr. Williams's knowledge of his
suspension in any of the four ways that section 18-8001 allows that burden to be met. A rational
trier of fact might make reasonable inferences based on substantial information, but in Mr.
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Williams's case, the information presented regarding his knowledge about his license being
suspended was so insubstantial and lacking that a rational trier of fact could not have relied on it
in making that inference. Because no evidence directly addressed the fact that Mr. Williams
knew his license was suspended, and a rational trier of fact could not infer from the evidence
actually presented that Mr. Williams knew his license was suspended on February 15, 2013, the
state failed to meet its burden with respect to that element of the offense of driving without
privileges.
CONCLUSION

A judgment of conviction can be overturned on appeal if any element of the offense was
not supported by substantial evidence that a rational trier of fact could rely upon to establish that
element. At trial, the State failed to present substantial evidence that Mr. Williams was the
driver identified by Officer Bateman, and the State failed to present substantial evidence that Mr.
Williams knew of his license suspension on February 15, 2013.
In the alternative, a judgment of conviction can be overturned when the appellant
demonstrates the kind of fundamental error that occurred in this case. Appellant requests that
this Court reverse the judgment.
DATED, this 41h day of September, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 4th day of September, 2014, I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document in the above-caption matter to:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010
Hand Delivered to the Attorney General's mailbox at the Supreme Court.
By interdepartmental mail.
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